No Response Instead Of Stock Recommendations: Evidence From Korea by Yoo, Youngtae & Kang, Minjung
The Journal of Applied Business Research – July/August 2015 Volume 31, Number 4 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1563 The Clute Institute 
“No Response” Instead Of Stock 
Recommendations: Evidence From Korea 
Youngtae Yoo, Incheon National University, South Korea 
Minjung Kang, Incheon National University, South Korea 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The objectives of this study are to confirm the theories and findings of empirical research related 
to stock recommendations in analysts’ reports and to examine from various angles the 
significance of stock recommendation revisions in the Korean capital market. In a considerable 
number of analysts’ reports, no stock recommendations are made; this area of the report remains 
blank. In this study, the blank is labeled “No Response”. We analyze the factors related to the 
decision to omit stock recommendations and the informational content of analysts’ reports in 
which no stock recommendations are made. There is no previous research on this phenomenon in 
Korea or other countries. Under the assumptions that the optimum portfolio of investors is 
affected by the trading of stocks, and that analysts’ reports reflect market expectations, we 
investigate the informational content of reports in which no stock recommendations are made by 
observing the abnormal returns on the day of disclosure. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he objectives of this study are to confirm theories and findings of previous empirical research on 
stock recommendations in analysts’ reports, and to examine the significance of revisions to stock 
recommendations in the Korean capital market from various points of view. Analysts act as 
information intermediaries in the capital market, and their reports alleviate the information asymmetry between 
enterprises and information users (Asquith et al., 2005). These reports provide critical help to studies of the capital 
market because they provide useful insight into and understanding of the behavior of market participants that is 
difficult to observe directly. Since analysts offer earnings forecasts and stock recommendations for many enterprises 
in their reports, the accuracy of the forecasting activities they provide directly affects the reputation and determines 
the reward of those firms. Investors also make decisions about individual investments and evaluate the performance 
of analysts and firms in which they own stock based on the accuracy of the data provided in analysts’ reports. From 
the viewpoint of investors, not that of the capital market, specific investment decision-making is based on analysts’ 
reports. Potential investors either buy company stocks or adopt a wait-and-see attitude depending on what they learn 
from these reports. Stockholders exhibit specific behavioral patterns such as selling their stocks or reducing their 
holdings based on these reports. Thus, many decisions may be based on the forecasts of analysts, and behavioral 
patterns may also vary according to analysts’ specific stock recommendations. 
 
In this study, an overview is provided of earnings forecasts and stock recommendations of analysts as 
information intermediaries in the Korean capital market. Several studies have systematically examined the effects of 
report content on capital markets, the characteristics of earnings forecasts, and the accuracy of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. Factors influencing decision-making have also been well studied. In addition, many studies on stock 
recommendations have focused on the informational content of stock recommendations. However, no systematic 
analysis of the characteristics of stock recommendations and related decision-making factors has been conducted. 
 
Five stock recommendations have been identified in previous studies: “Strong Buy”, “Buy”, “Hold”, 
“Underweight”, and “Sell”. These are commonly used in analysts’ reports. In a sizable percentage of these reports, 
however, no stock recommendation is made; this area of the report is left blank (4.55%). In this study, a blank stock 
T 
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recommendation is defined as “No Response,” and the decision-making process behind this lack of response and 
informational content of reports in which this phenomenon is observed are analyzed. The FnGuide database 
provides the data for all analysts’ reports regardless of content (i.e., whether or not they contain earnings forecasts 
and stock recommendations). Therefore, the FnGuide provides us with all information relevant to a firm, including 
the disclosure dates of the reports containing no stock recommendations (“No Response”). The data from the 
Institutional Brokers Estimate System, which are commonly used in conventional stock recommendation studies, 
provide information only for cases in which the stock recommendations of individual analysts have been altered. To 
the best of our knowledge, no studies have been conducted on the lack of stock recommendations in analysts’ 
reports in Korea or elsewhere. In this study, the factors influencing analysts to leave the stock recommendations area 
of a report blank are examined for the first time. 
  
RELATED RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Previous Studies 
 
Stock recommendations by analysts provide summary information about the intrinsic value of a company. 
In previous studies, informational content was verified by the abnormal returns obtained when an investment was 
made according to stock recommendations. Womack (1996) and Elton et al. (1986) reported that high abnormal 
returns could be obtained for six months after analysts gave the “Buy” recommendation or the recommendation 
grade was raised. Barber et al. (2001) used a consensus of stock investment grades from analysts and showed that 
high investment returns could be obtained by establishing a “Buy” portfolio including companies with the highest 
consensus and a “Sell” portfolio including companies with the lowest consensus. In Korean studies, Kim and Eum 
(2006) verified that the effects of stock recommendations and adjustment are already reflected in the target stock 
price, and that changes in stock recommendations result in a greater stock price reaction. Jeong and Lim (2005) 
showed that cumulative abnormal returns are dependent on the stock recommendations of analysts and their earnings 
forecasts, and that a high cumulative abnormal return is achieved when a “Buy” recommendation and high earnings 
forecasts are issued simultaneously. In summary, the results of Korean and international studies are similar in that 
the usefulness of stock recommendations corresponds significantly to the stock price at the time of disclosure. This 
suggests that analysts’ reports can be used as a strategic index during investor decision-making about investment in 
a specific stock. 
 
Other studies have investigated the role of consensus information in achieving excess returns based on the 
stock recommendations of analysts. Stock recommendation consensus can be expressed as a numerical value: the 
average value for stock recommendations during a certain period for a specific company. Jegadeesh et al. (2004) 
showed that a positive abnormal return could be obtained by establishing a portfolio using consensus values, but 
they concluded that the earnings rate was insufficient if future earnings rates and other reliable variables were 
extracted. Kho and Kim (2007) showed that no abnormal return could be achieved when the portfolio was 
established using a consensus of information on “Sell” and “Buy” recommendations in the Korean capital market. 
They also pointed out that a conflict of interest exists in the business relationship between analysts and companies 
with regard to the tendency always to recommend “Buy.” In situations where the major recommendation is “Buy,” 
the consensus stock recommendation may not have additional informational content. However, if the qualitative 
characteristics of stock recommendations are controlled so that genuine “Buy” and “Sell” recommendations can be 
distinguished, the consensus information may have additional value. Most previous studies have focused on the 
informational content of the recommendation grade, the grade change itself, or the consensus. This is the first study 
to investigate the factors related to the decision to provide “No Response”, or to leave the stock recommendation 
blank in analysts’ forecast reports. The following section presents the hypotheses of this study and provides a more 
detailed explanation. 
 
Hypotheses 
 
Stock recommendations by analysts contain various kinds of information needed in the capital market. The 
existence of stock recommendations in itself provides information on the capital market (Kim and Eum, 2006). In 
most cases (90.90%), analysts simultaneously disclose stock recommendations and changes in earnings forecasts 
relevant to the performance of a certain company. Most previous studies examined market reaction with reference to 
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the day the earnings forecast was issued or the day that stock recommendations were disclosed. Similarly, in this 
study, informational content is analyzed based on abnormal returns with reference to the day the analyst report is 
disclosed. 
 
The general structures of the stock recommendations of corporate analysts may differ for each firm. 
However, previous studies conducted in and outside Korea have shown that recommendations may be generally 
classified into five grades, and that complexity in the terms of the various investment grades of different stock firms 
has no significant influence on the stock price response (Lee and Choi, 2003). Table 1 shows the five types of stock 
recommendations by individual stock firms classified in the FnGuide: “Strong Buy,” “Buy,” “Hold,” Underweight,” 
and “Sell.” This same system is applied in this study for the purposes of the analysis. 
 
Table 1. Classification of Stock Recommendations 
Types of Stock Recommendations Grade 
Classified 
Recommendation 
Positive Buy / Continue Positive Buy / Concentrate Buy / Strong Buy 5 Strong Buy 
Short-Term Buy / Buy / Prospective Buy / Maintain Buy / Continued Buy / Split Buy 
/ Overweight / Over Earnings Rate / New Buy / Newcomer / Long-Term Buy 
Long And Short-Term Buy / Low Price Buy / Conditional Buy / Mid-Term Buy / Mid- 
And Long-Term Buy 
Mid- And Long-Term Bottom Buy / Prospective Investment / Accumulate / Add / Buy 
Continue Buy / Long-Term Buy / Outperform / Overperformer 
Overweight / Short-Term Buy / Trading Buy / Tr Buy / Recommended List  
4 Buy 
Wait-And-See / Short-Term Hold / Short-Term Neutral / Hold Buying / Hold / Market 
Wait-And-See 
Market Average / Maintain / Long-Term Wait-And-See / Long-Term Hold / Neutral / 
Hold 
Continue Hold / Marketperform / Marketperformer / Neutral 
3 Hold 
Underweight / Below Market / Below Average / Marketunderperform 
Marketunderperformer / Reduce / Underperform 
Underperformer / Underweight 
2 Underweight 
Strong Sell / Sell / Short-Term Sell / Sell 1 Sell 
 
However, unlike in previous studies, the conditions under which a report is filed in which the stock 
recommendation remains blank are also considered in this study, and “No Response” is included as one of the 
classifications. 
 
Analysts provide various kinds of forecast information using their information-gathering and forecasting 
abilities, which are superior to those of general investors. Information users make investment decisions based on the 
forecast information provided by analysts (Givoly and Lakonishok, 1979; Jeong and Lim, 2005). Analysts analyze 
public information that is available to everyone in the market using their professional forecasting capabilities. 
Analysts acquire information from managers through company visits and interviews. Due to information asymmetry 
between managers and external information users, financial analysts’ reports constitute a very important source of 
private information. Analysts know the importance of these reports, and strive to provide good recommendations. 
Therefore, in the absence of an alternative motive for leaving the stock recommendation blank, we can speculate that 
choosing the “No Response” option indicates that the analyst has insufficient information. Analysts must take into 
account the effect of their recommendations on their reputation because their performance is evaluated based on the 
accuracy of their analysts’ reports. If analysts are not confident of their own forecasts due to lack of information 
about a company, they may leave the stock recommendation blank. For analysts to make accurate forecasts, both 
public data and private information about the insider are necessary. More accurate analysts’ reports alleviate the 
information asymmetry between general investors and companies. However, access to private information differs 
among individual analysts and the agencies to which they belong. According to the structure of capital markets, 
market expectations are formed through stock recommendations. Therefore, an analyst working for an affiliated 
broker (a Chaebol) may be able to gather more private information on the broker’s affiliated companies. These 
analysts are in a superior informational position. They may use the “No Response” recommendation less often due 
to their abundance of public and private information about companies. 
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Analysts’ forecasts depend on both the quantity of public and private information and the ability to 
interpret that information. Mikhail et al. (1997), Clement (1999), and Jacob et al. (1999) reported that concerns 
about experience, ability, and task complexity and environmental factors related to analyst agencies affect the 
accuracy of the earnings forecast. The specific results of these studies showed an association between continuous 
service years (analysts with many years of working experience) and high accuracy in earnings forecasts. Stickel 
(1992) reported that analysts who were awarded for their work made more accurate earnings forecasts than those of 
other analysts who had not been rewarded. In addition, changes in earnings forecasts had a greater effect on stock 
prices. Leone and Wu (2002) also reported that analysts with superior earnings forecasting abilities were more likely 
to be selected for their superior skills, and that their strong abilities were maintained even after their selection. This 
suggests that the earnings forecasts calculated by the best analysts may be used more often by investors. Thus, 
analysts with long service careers or those who are rewarded for their superior work produce higher-quality reports 
because of their superior personal ability to interpret the given information. Therefore, due to their superior ability, 
these analysts are expected to leave the stock recommendation blank less often. Based on these observations, the 
following hypotheses are put forward. 
 
Hypothesis 1-1: An analyst who is in a Chaebol (an affiliated brokerage) will leave the stock recommendation blank 
(“No Response”) less frequently than one who is not in a Chaebol. 
 
Hypothesis 1-2: An analyst with superior forecasting ability will leave the stock recommendation blank (“No 
Response”) less frequently than one without superior forecasting ability. 
 
According to Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981), if sellers have access to better information about 
product quality than their consumers and the cost of verifiably disclosing this information is zero, sellers will always 
disclose. This occurs because rational consumers will associate non-disclosure with the lowest quality. These studies 
showed that managers may not be willing to provide certain types of information in certain circumstances. However, 
in these studies, the statistical analysis was limited to specific events where the managers consistently gave no 
response. On the other hand, in cases where analysts omit certain information from their analysts’ reports, as in this 
study, the date of the “No Response” event can be determined and all other information except the stock 
recommendation can be verified. Thus, the reaction of investors to the “No Response” recommendation can be 
directly observed. Market reaction to “No Response” can also be monitored. In this study, the reaction of investors 
to “No Response,” which has hitherto been proven only theoretically, is actually verified. Hence, another hypothesis 
is established: 
 
Hypothesis 1-3: Change in the stock recommendation from a grade to “No Response” has informational content. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Variable Settings 
 
Ratio of “No Response” to Other Recommendations 
 
In order to measure how often a specific analyst leaves the stock recommendation blank (i.e., “No 
Response”) with regard to a given company, the variable Nullcons is defined. The data for the variable Nullcons are 
established for all analysts, companies, and years. Thus, the variable reflects the number of “No Response” instances 
for each analyst with regard to each analyzed company in each year divided by the number of analysts’ reports. The 
ratio of “No Response” to other stock recommendations in the disclosed analysts’ reports is higher for analysts with 
large values for Nullcons. The value of this variable is 0.1 if the “No Response” option is chosen in one out of ten 
reports. The variable Nullcons is defined as follows. 
 
Nullcons : (The number of reports in which “No Response” is chosen by an analyst for a given company in a given 
year) / (The total number of reports for a given company in the same year) 
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Cumulative Abnormal Return 
 
In this study, the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is defined as follows, and the following market-
adjusted model is used in which the market return is benchmarked. 
 
ARit = Rit - Rmt (1) 
Rit : the stock return of company i on day t 
Rmt : the stock return of the market portfolio on day t 
 
The abnormal return of individual sample companies (ARit) computed in the equation above is accumulated 
to calculate CAR, as shown in the following equation: 
 
CAR(t1, t2) = ∑ ARt  (2) 
 
This calculation of CAR is used as a dependent variable in the model to test Hypothesis 1-3 in order to 
verify the informational content of the change in recommendation to “No Response.” Assuming an efficient stock 
market, the stock price reflects all disclosed information of the past and present. In this study, it is assumed that the 
information used to create the stock recommendations disclosed by analysts is immediately reflected in the stock 
price. Hence, a relatively narrow time window (−1, 0 and +1 day) is set for the analysis to verify the variables for 
informational content and changes in the stock return. 
 
Chaebol Affiliation Dummy 
 
Chaebol groups in this study include the thirty largest business groups identified by the Korea Fair Trade 
Commission. The forecasting activities of analysts are affected not only by personal factors such as the number of 
years of service and forecasting experience in specific industries and companies, but also by the characteristics of 
the firms to which the analysts belong, the stakeholder relationship between the affiliated stock firms and the target 
companies of the analysis, and the characteristics of the ownership structure and governance structure of the 
analyzed companies (Mikhail et al., 1997; Clement, 1999; Jacob et al., 1999). Analysts are generally affiliated with 
firms that publish financial reports. They are evaluated by the very firms that they analyze. Hence, they have access 
to private information about the firms they analyze. Companies affiliated with business groups (known as Chaebols 
in Korea) may all be evaluated by the same analyst, who is familiar with the insiders of the group. For example, an 
analyst working for Samsung Securities Co., Ltd. may provide very effective analyses due to access to private 
information during the analysis of the parent company, Samsung Electronics. Therefore, in this study, a proxy is 
utilized for the information environment of the analyst in the form of the variable ChaeAffdum, as follows: 
 
ChaeAffdum: 1 if an analyst affiliated with a stock firm belonging to a Chaebol group reports on the stock 
recommendation for a company in the same Chaebol group; 0, otherwise. 
 
Ability 
 
In this study, the number of years of service and analyst ranking are used as measures of forecasting ability. 
Mikhail et al. (1997), Clement (1999), and Jacob et al. (1999) showed that the earnings forecasts of analysts with 
many years of experience (continuous service years) were highly accurate due to their skill at performing forecasting 
activities repeatedly. Thus, the variable Analage is defined in this study as follows: 
 
Analage: continuous service years as an analyst 
 
Analyst reputation is measured based on the ranking of analysts in each industry as published in the 
Maekyung Economy magazine, the Maeil Business Newspaper, the Hankyung Business Weekly, and the Korea 
Economic Daily newspaper. These weekly magazines publish rankings data twice a year. Rankings for the first half 
of the year are published in July based on the achievements of analysts between January and June, and those for the 
second half of the year are published in January based on their achievements between July and December. The top 
five analysts in each industry are generally recognized in business circles and the media as powerful “star” analysts 
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among all analysts, institutional investors, and private investors in the same industry. Accordingly, the top five 
analysts in each industry, based on their achievements throughout a given year during the study period, are 
operationally defined as high-reputation analysts in this study. 
 
Stickel (1992) and Leone and Wu (2002) reported that analysts with superior earnings forecasting ability 
were more likely to be selected as top analysts. In those studies, the superior earnings forecasting ability of top 
analysts was maintained even after their selection. Therefore, in this study, analysts selected as top analysts in the 
year immediately preceding a given year are assumed to be in a superior position to analyze data for that year. 
Because selection as a top analyst is an ex post process following the submission of analysts’ reports, these analysts 
may have better access to the information of target companies thereafter. The variable Best is therefore used to 
measure access convenience, defined as follows: 
 
Best: 1 if a company is analyzed by a high-reputation analyst, and 0 otherwise. 
 
“No Response” Alteration Dummy 
 
The specific definition of the independent variable Nulldum to test Hypothesis 1-3 is as follows. As 
mentioned in the Introduction, stock recommendations are classified into five types: “S/Buy”, “Buy”, “Hold”, 
“U/Weight”, and “Sell”. To test the informational content of a change to “No Response,” cases are classified based 
on these five recommendations. The following five variables are defined individually for changes from each of these 
recommendations to “No Response.” The independent variable Nulldum is set to verify the change to “No Response.” 
 
Nulldum1: 1, if the immediately previous recommendation was S/Buy and the current recommendation is “No 
Response”; 0, otherwise. 
 
Nulldum2: 1, if the immediately previous recommendation was Buy and the current recommendation is “No 
Response”; 0, otherwise. 
 
Nulldum3: 1, if the immediately previous recommendation was Hold and the current recommendation is “No 
Response”; 0, otherwise. 
 
Nulldum4: 1, if the immediately previous recommendation was U/Weight and the current recommendation is “No 
Response”; 0, otherwise. 
 
Nulldum5: 1, if the immediately previous recommendation was Sell and the current recommendation is “No 
Response”; 0, otherwise. 
 
Regression Analysis Model 
 
The following multiple regression equation is utilized to test Hypotheses 1-1 and 1-2. The model is 
designed to test the hypothesis that analysts in better information environments and those with superior ability 
change the stock recommendation to “No Response” less frequently than other analysts. 
 
Nullcons = a0 + a1 ChaeAffdum + a2 MV + a3 LEV + a4 ROE + a5 NGE + a6 BETA + a7 Coverage + a8 
D_EPS_FORE + a9 D_PRICE_FORE + a10 KOSPI + e  (3) 
 
Nullcons = a0 + a1 Analage + a2 MV + a3 LEV + a4 ROE + a5 NGE + a6 BETA + a7 Coverage + a8 
D_EPS_FORE + a9 D_PRICE_FORE + a10 KOSPI + e  (4) 
 
Nullcons = a0 + a1 Best + a2 MV + a3 LEV + a4 ROE + a5 NGE + a6 BETA + a7 Coverage + a8 
D_EPS_FORE + a9 D_PRICE_FORE + a10 KOSPI + e  (5) 
 
The dependent variable is Nullcons, as described earlier, which captures the ratio of “No Response” 
recommendations to other stock recommendations. The information environment is measured using the variable 
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ChaeAffdum, and ability is tested using the variables Analage and Best. If the coefficient of a1 in regression equations 
(3)–(5) is significant and negative, analysts in poorer information environments and those with inferior forecasting 
ability are more likely to give the “No Response” recommendation. 
 
Factors that are expected to affect the “No Response” ratio include the total market value (MV), debt ratio 
(LEV), return on equity (ROE), reports of loss (NGE), BETA, coverage (Coverage), EPS (earnings per share) 
revision rate (EPS), and stock price revision rate (PRICE). MV, LEV, NGE, and BETA were chosen to control for the 
information environment of the target company of the analyst. If a company’s total market price is low and the debt 
ratio is high, and if the company has reported a loss, the information environment of the company may be better than 
otherwise. If the value of BETA is greater, market volatility may be higher, and thus the information about that 
business may be less certain. 
 
Several previous studies utilized analyst coverage as a proxy for the information environment of a company 
(McNichols and O’Brien, 1997; Lang et al., 2006). In this study, we posit that the “No Response” option will be 
chosen less frequently by analysts of companies with greater coverage. ROE is the index that indicates the size of 
the return in comparison with the input equity capital. In this study, ROE is used to control for the return of a target 
company. 
 
In addition to stock recommendations, analysts’ reports contain earnings forecasts and stock price forecasts. 
These control variables are set using the ratio of change with reference to the forecasted values immediately 
previous to a given forecast in order to control for changes in the earnings and stock price forecasts. 
 
The multiple regression equation used to test Hypothesis 1-3 is as follows. As described above, the 
independent variable, Nulldum, verifies a change to the “No Response” option from one of the five previously 
described stock recommendations. The study model and the individual control variables are therefore defined as 
follows: 
 
CAR(-1,1) = a0 + a1 Nulldum + a2 MV + a3 LEV + a4 ROE + a5 NGE + a6 BETA + a7 Coverage + a8 
D_EPS_FORE + a9 D_PRICE_FORE + a10 KOSPI + e  (6) 
 
The major financial characteristics are the total market value (MV), debt ratio (LEV), return on equity 
(ROE), reports of loss (NGE), BETA, coverage (Coverage), EPS (earnings per share) revision rate (EPS), and stock 
price revision rate (PRICE). These variables have been employed in previous studies. The debt ratio is included 
among the variables in order to control for cases in which the influence of disclosures from companies with high 
debt ratios on the stock market return is insignificant or relatively weak (Aboody et al., 1999). The total market 
value is included to control for the effect of a company’s information environment on the stock market return 
(Collins and Kothari, 1989). Conflicting results in previous research precluded advanced determination of the sign 
of the effect of the debt ratio and total assets on the market reaction. Reports of loss are included in order to confirm 
the results of a previous study, which stated that positive and negative accounts differ in quality (Hayn, 1995). 
BETA, which is derived from the monthly stock market return, is used to measure risk. A higher value for BETA 
suggests a negative regression coefficient due to greater uncertainty about a firm’s future expected rate of return and 
the corresponding market reaction (Kim et al., 2013). Because analyst coverage is used as a proxy for the 
information environment, higher coverage (indicating a better information environment) results in a stronger short-
term market reaction in an efficient market. ROE, the index representing the earnings rate with reference to equity 
capital, is used to control for the rate of return of the target companies. As in the model for Hypotheses 1-1 and 1-2, 
the control variables are set using the ratio of change with reference to the forecasted values immediately previous to 
a given forecast in order to control for changes in earnings and stock price forecasts. 
 
Sample Description 
 
The observations are selected from firms listed on the KOSPI and KOSDAQ markets as of December 31, 
2011 that satisfy the following criteria: (1) companies (except financial companies) listed on the KOSPI and 
KOSDAQ markets with accounts closing in December; (2) companies with financial statements, stock prices, and 
analyst forecasts available in the Fn-DataguidePro and KIS-VALUE databases. 
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Data for twelve years (2000 to 2011) are used that satisfy the above conditions. To minimize the effect of 
outliers, the top and bottom 1% of values for all independent and dependent variables are winsorized. In total, 
46,115 firm-year-analyst observations are used for testing Hypotheses 1-1 and 1-2. An additional 381,235 firm-year-
analyst reporting event date observations are also used for testing Hypothesis 1-3. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
The descriptive statistics for each group are shown in Panels A and B of Table 2. This table presents mean, 
median, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values. The observation period is from 2000 to 2011. All key 
variables are described herein. 
 
In Panel A, the dependent variable is Nullcons, which is measured based on analyses listed in the Fn-
DataGuidePro. Nullcons has a mean (median) value of 0.1357 (0.0000) and maximum and minimum values of 1 and 
0, respectively. The mean (median) of the Chaebol-affiliated dummy (ChaeAffdum) variable is 0.0124 (0.0000). The 
mean (median) value of the best analyst dummy (Best) is 0.1835 (0.0000), while the mean (median) number of 
continuous years of service (Analage) is 3.8960 (3.0000). The mean value (median) for market value (MV) is 26.9550 
(26.7043), which is KRW 509 trillion (KRW 396 trillion). The mean and median values for the variable LEV are 
2.2808 and 1.3717, respectively, suggesting that the average total liability of our sample represents 228% of total 
firm equity. The ROE variable has a mean value of 0.1071 and a median value of 0.1200. The mean value for NGE 
is 0.0997, indicating that the proportion of firms reporting loss is 10% on average. The mean value for the BETA 
variable is 0.9809. The Coverage variable has a mean value of 17.1046, indicating that on average, 17 analysts 
perform financial analyses for the firms in this study. The mean values for the D_EPS_FORE and D_PRICE_FORE 
variables are −0.0070 and 0.0059, respectively. The mean of the KOSPI dummy variable is 0.6708, that is, 67.08% 
of observations are from firms with shares traded on the KOSPI; otherwise, they are traded on the KOSDAQ. 
 
In Panel B, the dependent variable is CAR(−1,1), measured based on analyst reports from the Fn-
DataGuidePro database. The mean (median) three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR(−1,1)) is 0.19% (0.01%). 
Nulldum has a mean (median) value of 0.0418 (0.0000) and maximum and minimum values of 1 and 0, respectively. 
This means that the proportion of “No Response” reports is 4.18% of the full sample. The mean value (median) for 
market value (MV) is 27.5071 (27.0000), which is KRW 883 trillion (KRW 532 trillion). The mean and median 
values for the leverage (LEV) variable are 2.1042 and 1.2500, respectively. The return on equity (ROE) variable has 
a mean value of 0.1119 and a median value of 0.1223. The proportion of firms reporting loss (NGE) is 9.27% on 
average. The mean value for the BETA variable is 0.9703. The average number of analysts’ reports (Coverage) is 
19.9891. The mean values for the D_EPS_FORE and D_PRICE_FORE variables are −0.0062 and 0.0065, 
respectively. The mean of the KOSPI dummy variable is 0.7621; that is, 76.21% of observations are from firms with 
shares traded on the KOSPI; otherwise, they are traded on the KOSDAQ. 
 
  
The Journal of Applied Business Research – July/August 2015 Volume 31, Number 4 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1571 The Clute Institute 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics for testing hypotheses 1-1 and 1-2. 
Variables N Mean StdDev Minimum Median Maximum 
Nullcons  46,115 0.1357 0.3231 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
ChaeAffdum  46,115 0.0012 0.0114 0.0000 0.0000 0.1111 
Best  46,115 0.1835 0.3871 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Analage  46,115 3.8960 2.4727 1.0000 3.0000 11.0000 
MV  46,115 26.9550 1.8884 23.3391 26.7043 31.4794 
LEV  46,115 2.2808 2.5550 0.1644 1.3727 15.7479 
ROE  46,115 0.1071 0.1439 −0.6880 0.1200 0.4203 
NGE  46,115 0.0997 0.2996 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
BETA  46,115 0.9809 0.3604 0.1966 0.9746 1.8427 
Coverage  46,115 17.1046 10.8842 1.0000 16.0000 51.0000 
D_EPS_FORE 46,115 −0.0070 0.0859 −0.3951 0.0000 0.3147 
D_PRI_FORE  46,115 0.0059 0.0374 −0.1022 0.0000 0.1557 
KOSPI  46,115 0.6708 0.4699 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 
Panel B. Descriptive statistics for testing hypothesis 1-3. 
Variables N Mean StdDev Minimum Median Maximum 
CaR(−1,1)  381,235 0.0019 0.0541 −0.2351 0.0001 0.2579 
Nulldum 381,235 0.0418 0.2001 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
MV  381,235 27.5071 1.8490 23.7960 27.0000 31.8272 
LEV  381,235 2.1042 2.3022 0.1899 1.2500 13.9474 
ROE  381,235 0.1119 0.1319 −0.5620 0.1223 0.4059 
NGE  381,235 0.0927 0.2900 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
BETA  381,235 0.9703 0.3482 0.2023 0.9600 1.7901 
Coverage  381,235 19.9891 10.4209 1.0000 20.0000 46.0000 
D_EPS_FORE 381,235 −0.0062 0.1193 −0.6166 0.0000 0.5270 
D_PRI_FORE  381,235 0.0065 0.0702 −0.2500 0.0000 0.3636 
KOSPI  381,235 0.7621 0.4258 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 
Before hypothesis testing, the Pearson correlation coefficients of the key variables in the multiple 
regression equations are determined. These are reported in Table 3. In the table, Panel A lists correlations from the 
firm-year-analyst dataset in terms of Nullcons, and Panel B represents that from the firm-year-event date dataset 
analyzed in terms of CAR(−1,1). 
 
In Panel A, the correlation coefficient between Nullcons and ChaeAffdum is significant and negative (−0.0384) 
at a confidence level of 1%. A positive relationship is evident between Nullcons and analyst ability (Best and Analage). 
These results show that as values for ChaeAffdum, Best, and Analage increase in analysts’ reports, the ratio of “No 
Response” to other responses decreases. However, because these results are based on simple correlation analyses, 
and considering that other variables affecting these variables are not controlled, these results cannot be generalized. 
Looking at the correlations between independent variables, all correlation coefficients are <0.3, which means that 
the chances of a multicollinearity problem are relatively low. In addition, the correlation coefficients between MV 
and COVERAGE are 0.7006 and 0.6929 in panels A and B, respectively. These values are high and positive. If MV 
and COVERAGE are analyzed together in one model, multicollinearity may result. Thus, the VIF (variance inflation 
factor) value of each model is determined. The highest VIF values in the models (in tests of Hypotheses 1-1 and 1-2) 
are <5.0 (3.58 and 3.53, respectively); thus, no serious multicollinearity problems are identified among the 
independent variables in the model. 
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Table 3. Pearson Correlation Coefficients Matrix 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics for testing hypotheses 1-1 and 1-2. 
 
ChaeAffdum Best Analage MV LEV ROE NGE BETA COVERAGE 
D_EPS_ 
FORE 
D_PRICE_ 
FORE 
KOSPI 
Nullcons −0.0384 −0.0793 −0.0773 −0.2443 0.0405 −0.0143 0.0169 0.0202 −0.2399 0.0046 −0.0574 −0.2095 
 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0022 0.0003 <.0001 <.0001 0.322 <.0001 <.0001 
             ChaeAffdum 1 0.0183 0.0194 0.0626 −0.0202 0.0060 −0.0131 0.0014 0.0498 0.0027 0.0078 0.0550 
 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.2015 0.0048 0.7572 <.0001 0.5699 0.0928 <.0001 
             Best  1 0.2567 0.0567 −0.0102 0.0015 −0.0052 −0.0561 0.0246 0.0056 0.0365 0.0779 
 
  <.0001 <.0001 0.0283 0.7437 0.269 <.0001 <.0001 0.2265 <.0001 <.0001 
             Analage   1 0.2226 −0.0130 0.0123 −0.0130 −0.0102 0.0749 −0.0019 0.0571 0.0741 
 
   <.0001 0.0051 0.0082 0.0053 0.028 <.0001 0.6827 <.0001 <.0001 
             MV    1 −0.1748 0.1762 −0.1285 0.0032 0.7006 0.0723 0.1162 0.5291 
 
    <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.4927 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
             LEV     1 0.0473 −0.0468 −0.0046 −0.1047 −0.0275 −0.0426 −0.2478 
 
     <.0001 <.0001 0.3202 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
             ROE      1 −0.6803 −0.0562 0.2099 0.1723 0.1102 0.0006 
 
      <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.8924 
             NGE       1 0.1264 −0.1267 −0.1749 −0.0812 −0.1003 
 
       <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
             BETA        1 0.1009 −0.0417 −0.0144 −0.2729 
 
        <.0001 <.0001 0.002 <.0001 
             COVERAGE         1 0.0582 0.0854 0.2758 
 
         <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
             D_EPS_FORE          1 0.1927 0.0608 
 
          <.0001 <.0001 
             D_PRICE_FORE           1 0.0481 
 
           <.0001 
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(Table 3 continued) 
Panel B. Descriptive statistics for testing hypothesis 1-3. 
 
Nulldum MV LEV ROE NGE BETA COVERAGE 
D_EPS_ 
FORE 
D_PRICE_ 
FORE 
KOSPI 
CaR(−1,1) −0.0014 0.0367 −0.0076 0.0212 −0.0106 0.0108 0.0288 0.0266 0.0492 0.0152 
 
0.3874 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
           Nulldum 1 −0.1215 0.0144 −0.0104 0.0064 0.0034 −0.1211 −0.0017 −0.0169 −0.0882 
  
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0366 <.0001 0.2815 <.0001 <.0001 
           MV 
 
1 −0.1849 0.2143 −0.1512 0.0101 0.6929 0.0457 0.0541 0.4993 
   
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
           LEV 
  
1 0.0228 −0.0138 −0.0139 −0.1090 −0.0151 −0.0228 −0.2623 
    
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
           ROE 
   
1 −0.6866 −0.0628 0.2462 0.0860 0.0566 0.0329 
     
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
           NGE 
    
1 0.1318 −0.1457 −0.0715 −0.0380 −0.1368 
      
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
           BETA 
     
1 0.0942 −0.0194 −0.0029 −0.2411 
       
<.0001 <.0001 0.071 <.0001 
           COVERAGE  
     
1 0.0373 0.0361 0.2176 
        
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
           D_EPS_FORE  
      
1 0.1768 0.0360 
         
<.0001 <.0001 
           D_PRICE_FORE  
       
1 0.0231 
          
<.0001 
 
Empirical Results 
 
Table 4 displays the results of testing of Hypothesis 1-1 representing differences in the proportion of “No Response” reports between Chaebol-affiliated 
analysts and non-Chaebol-affiliated analysts. The results of the multivariate testing of Hypothesis 1-1 are based on the estimation in Equation (3). The dependent 
variable in the model is Nulldum, and the key independent variable is ChaeAffdum. The results are as follows (Table 4). 
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Table 4. Results of Multiple Regression Analyses for Testing of Hypothesis 1-1 
Nullcons = a0 + a1 ChaeAffdum + a2 MV + a3 LEV + a4 ROE + a5 NGE + a6 BETA + a7 Coverage + a8 D_EPS_FORE + a9 
D_PRI_FORE + a10 KOSPI + e 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Nullcons 
(1) (2) (3) 
Coefficient T-statistics Coefficient T-statistics Coefficient T-statistics 
Intercept 0.0930 9.11*** 0.5714 13.98*** 0.5779 14.13*** 
ChaeAffdum −0.5810 −8.90*** −0.5565 −8.46*** −0.5550 −8.45*** 
MV   −0.0174 −11.98*** −0.0183 −12.31*** 
LEV   −0.0023 −3.50 −0.0025 −3.79*** 
ROE     0.0661 4.53*** 
NGE     0.0013 0.20 
BETA     0.0015 0.31 
Coverage −0.0063 −40.79*** 0.0002 −21.27*** −0.0045 −21.76*** 
D_EPS_FORE 0.1156 8.29*** 0.0139 8.74*** 0.1062 7.46*** 
D_PRI_FORE −0.5421 −22.03*** 0.0248 −20.88*** −0.5310 −21.24*** 
KOSPI −0.0969 −25.61*** 0.0045 −16.91*** −0.0001 −5.71*** 
Yeardummy Included Included Included 
Inddummy Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.1135 0.1164 0.1171 
Observations 46,115 46,115 46,115 
Notes: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. 
 
The signs of the coefficients of the included variables are notable. In the first column of Table 4, 
characteristics of analyst reports such as Coverage, D_EPS_FORE, and D_PRICE_FORE are represented. 
Controlling for these characteristics, the t-statistic of ChaeAffdum is −8.90 (p = 0.01). The second column includes the 
results with the financial characteristics of firms such as market value (MV) and debt ratio (LEV) added to the first 
column. Controlling for firms’ financial characteristics, the t-statistic of ChaeAffdum is −8.46, which is significant at 
the 1% level. The last column displays all related control variables included in the model, such as ROE, NGE, and 
BETA. In this case, the t-statistic of ChaeAffdum is −8.45, which is also significant at the 1% level. In all three 
analyses, the coefficients have significant negative values (β1 = −0.5810, −0.5565, and −0.5550, respectively). These 
negative coefficients suggest that the proportion of “No Response” recommendations is lower for Chaebol-affiliated 
analysts. Analysts in Chaebol brokerages are likely to have access to superior information sources compared to the 
data sources of other non-Chaebol brokerages, since Chaebols collect and retain huge amounts of data from various 
industries. Therefore, Chaebol-affiliated analysts have confidence in their own forecast values. These results suggest 
that analysts with lack of information tend to leave the stock recommendation area blank in their reports (“No 
Response”). Thus, Hypothesis 1-1 is supported. 
 
Panel A of Table 5 displays the results of testing of Hypothesis 1-2, representing differences in the 
proportion of “No Response” reports between best analysts and non-best analysts. Data in Panel B reveal that the 
proportion of “No Response” differs according to the number of years of service, reporting the results of the 
multivariate testing of Hypothesis 1-2 based on the estimation in Equations (4) and (5). The dependent variable in 
the model is Nulldum, and the key independent variables are Best and Analage. The results are as follows (Table 5). 
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Table 5. Results of Multiple Regression Analyses for Testing of Hypothesis 1-2 
Panel A. 
Nullcons = a0 + a1 Best + a2 MV + a3 LEV + a4 ROE + a5 NGE + a6 BETA + a7 Coverage + a8 D_EPS_FORE + a9 
D_PRI_FORE + a10 KOSPI + e 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Nullcons 
(1) (2) (3) 
Coefficient T-statistics Coefficient T-statistics Coefficient T-statistics 
Intercept 0.0781 7.12*** 0.5303 12.95*** 0.5376 13.12*** 
Best −0.0595 −18.84*** −0.0579 −18.38*** −0.0578 −18.33 
MV   −0.0165 −11.35*** −0.0173 −11.65*** 
LEV   −0.0023 −3.46*** −0.0025 −3.78*** 
ROE     0.0689 4.72*** 
NGE     0.0017 0.25 
BETA     −0.0008 −0.18 
Coverage −0.0065 −41.77*** −0.0047 −22.46*** −0.0048 −22.93*** 
D_EPS_FORE 0.1122 8.05*** 0.1179 8.47*** 0.1017 7.15*** 
D_PRI_FORE −0.5223 −21.21*** −0.4997 −20.13*** −0.5138 −20.53*** 
KOSPI −0.0921 −24.30*** −0.0719 −16.13*** −0.0698 −14.32*** 
Yeardummy Included Included Included 
Inddummy Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.1168 0.1194 0.1202 
Observations 46,115 46,115 46,115 
 
Panel B. 
Nullcons = a0 + a1 Analage + a2 MV + a3 LEV + a4 ROE + a5 NGE + a6 BETA + a7 Coverage + a8 D_EPS_FORE + a9 
D_PRI_FORE + a10 KOSPI + e 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Nullcons 
(1) (2) (3) 
Coefficient T−statistics Coefficient T−statistics Coefficient T−statistics 
Intercept 0.1728 14.28*** 0.6244 15.12*** 0.6308 15.26*** 
Analage −0.0137 −20.53*** −0.0135 −20.28*** −0.0133 −20.10*** 
MV   −0.0165 −11.38*** −0.0173 −11.68*** 
LEV   −0.0022 −3.40*** −0.0024 −3.71*** 
ROE     0.0624 4.29*** 
NGE     0.0003 0.05 
BETA     0.0005 0.10 
Coverage −0.0063 −40.90*** −0.0045 −21.64*** −0.0046 −22.09*** 
D_EPS_FORE 0.1108 7.94*** 0.1166 8.37*** 0.1014 7.13*** 
D_PRI_FORE −0.5063 −20.55*** −0.4837 −19.48*** −0.4968 −19.84*** 
KOSPI −0.0916 −24.23*** −0.0713 −16.01*** −0.0691 −14.21* 
Yeardummy Included Included Included* 
Inddummy Included Included Included* 
Adjusted R2 0.1202 0.1229 0.1235 
Observations 46,115 46,115 46,115 
Notes: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. 
 
The signs of the coefficients of the included variables are notable. In the first column of panel A, 
characteristics of analyst reports such as Coverage, D_EPS_FORE, and D_PRICE_FORE are represented. 
Controlling for these characteristics, the t-statistics of Best and Analage are −18.84 (p = 0.01) and −20.53 (p = 0.01), 
respectively. The second column includes the results with financial characteristics of firms such as market value 
(MV) and debt ratio (LEV) added to the first column. Controlling for these financial characteristics, the t-statistics of 
the two key independent variables are −18.38 and −20.28, which are significant at the 1% level. The last column 
displays all related control variables included in the model, such as ROE, NGE, and BETA. In this case, the t-
statistics of Best and Analage are −18.33 and −20.10, which are also significant at the 1% level. In all three analyses, 
the coefficients have significant negative values. These negative coefficients suggest that the proportion of “No 
Response” is lower for top analysts. These results suggest that less capable analysts tend to leave the stock 
recommendation area blank in their reports (“No Response”). Thus, Hypothesis 1-2 is supported. 
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Table 6 displays the results of testing of Hypothesis 1-3 representing changes in recommendation from one 
of the five common stock recommendations to “No Response.” It reports the results of the multivariate testing of 
Hypothesis 1-3 based on the estimation in Equation (6). The dependent variable in the model is CAR(−1,1), and the 
key independent variable is Nulldum. The results are as follows (Table 6). 
 
Table 6. Results of Multiple Regression Analyses for Testing of Hypothesis 1-3 
CaR(-1,1) = a0 + a1 Nulldum + a2 MV + a3 LEV + a4 ROE + a5 NGE + a6 BETA + a7 Coverage + a8 D_EPS_FORE + a9 
D_PRI_FORE + a10 KOSPI + e 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: CaR(-1,1) 
(1) S/Buy (2) Buy (3) Hold (4) U/Weight (5) Sell 
Co-
efficient 
T-
statistics 
Co-
efficient 
T-
statistics 
Co-
efficient 
T-statistics 
C-
oefficient 
T-
statistics 
Co-
efficient 
T-
statistics 
Intercept −0.163 −2.16** −0.058 −3.76*** 0.036 2.55** 0.136 2.29** 0.040 1.20 
Nulldum1 0.007 1.41         
Nulldum2   −0.000 −1.92
*       
Nulldum3     0.002 2.35
**     
Nulldum4       0.008 1.71
*   
Nulldum5         −0.002 −0.38 
MV 0.006 2.08** 0.002 3.54*** −0.001 −1.68* −0.005 −2.13** −0.002 −1.48 
LEV 0.000 0.14 0.000 0.52 0.000 −1.02 0.000 1.29 −0.002 −5.55*** 
ROE 0.009 0.55 0.000 0.60 −0.001 −0.81 −0.000 −0.17 0.001 0.67 
NGE 0.000 0.01 −0.001 −0.66 −0.001 −0.97 0.002 1.15 −0.003 −1.05 
BETA −0.004 −1.33 0.000 0.48 −0.001 −1.17 0.003 0.84 −0.007 −1.25 
Coverage −0.000 −0.59 0.000 0.65 −0.000 −2.47** 0.000 0.52 0.001 2.53*** 
D_EPS_FORE −0.000 −1.33 0.000 1.47 0.000 1.08 0.000 2.05** 0.000 2.99*** 
D_PRI_FORE 0.038 0.88 0.025 11.42*** 0.006 2.34** 0.005 1.08 −0.064 −14.99*** 
KOSPI −0.008 −2.19** −0.002 −2.57** −0.002 −3.04*** 0.004 1.62 −0.007 −1.75 
Yeardummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Inddummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.0529 0.0059 0.0064 0.0866 0.6257 
Observations 663 207,797 53,220 1,214 60 
Notes: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test 
 
The signs of the coefficients of the included variables are notable. In the second column of Table 6, the t-
statistic of Nulldum2 is −1.92 (p = 0.10), which is significant at the 10% level. It indicates that stock returns from 
firms with “No Response” in the stock recommendations area of the financial report are significantly lower than 
those from firms with “Buy” recommendations. The second column displays all related control variables included in 
the model. The t-statistic of the Nulldum3 variable is 2.35, which is significant at the 5% level. It indicates that stock 
returns from firms with “No Response” in the stock recommendations area are significantly higher than those from 
firms with “Hold” recommendations. Thus, a change in the stock recommendation grade to “No Response” provides 
specific incremental informational content. This supports Hypothesis 1-3. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Analysts’ reports act as information intermediaries in the capital market, and thus alleviate information 
asymmetry between enterprises and information users (Asquith et al., 2005). Stock recommendations by analysts 
provide summaries of information about the intrinsic value of a company. In previous studies, informational content 
was verified depending on whether an abnormal return could be obtained if an investment was made according to 
stock recommendations. Analysts’ reports provide critical information for research on the capital market and useful 
insight into the behavior of market participants, which is difficult to observe directly. Since analysts offer earnings 
forecasts and stock recommendations for multiple enterprises in their reports, the accuracy of their forecast data 
directly influences their reputation and reward. Investors also make decisions on individual investments and evaluate 
the performance of analysts and firms based on the accuracy of the data that analysts provide. Thus, evaluation of 
various aspects of analysts’ reports may be helpful to a variety of players in the business world. 
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One objective of this study is to provide an overview of earnings forecasts and stock recommendations 
done by analysts who act as information intermediaries in the Korean capital market. There are five commonly used 
stock recommendations: “Strong Buy”, “Buy”, “Hold”, “Underweight”, and “Sell”. Most previous studies have 
analyzed these five types of recommendations. In a sizable percentage of analysts’ reports, however, the stock 
recommendation area of the report is left blank (4.55%). In this study, a blank in the place of one of these five stock 
recommendations is defined as “No Response,” and the decision-making factors involved in and informational 
content of this lack of response are analyzed. The Fn-Guide database provides the data for all analysts’ reports 
regardless of content (i.e., whether or not they contain earnings forecasts and stock recommendations). Analysts in 
Chaebol brokerages are likely to use superior information sources compared to data sources of analysts in non-
Chaebol brokerages, since Chaebols collect and retain huge amounts of data from various industries. In this study, 
analysts who lack information reported “No Response” more often than those with sufficient information. Analysts 
with inferior abilities reported “No Response” more often than those with superior abilities. Stock returns from firms 
with “No Response” recommendations work significantly lower than those of firms with “Buy” recommendations, 
and significantly higher than those of firms with “Hold” recommendations. Thus, we can conclude that an analyst 
report in which “No Response” is provided instead of a stock recommendation is missing a response due to lack of 
information. Thus, the results of this study demonstrate that “No Response” should be included as one of the 
recommendation categories along with “Strong Buy”, “Buy”, “Hold”, “Underweight”, and “Sell”, because leaving 
this portion of the report blank is an indicator of lack of meaningful informational content. Future studies will 
discuss this finding further. 
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